Abstract
The article aims to discern the contents and specifics of the French estimates in regard of the Czechoslovakian role in the interactions between the Third Republic and the Soviet Russia/USSR in 1920–1924. Chiefly, the author analyses the French answers on the question about the significance and potential function of Czechoslovakia in the interstate triangle. Rather recently published French diplomatic documents are used as sources, as well as the evidence taken from the Diplomatic archives of the French Ministry of Europe and foreign affairs, and the from funds of the Historical services of the French Ministry of Armed forces. The author concludes that Paris contemplated two main roles of Prague in the triangle USSR – Czechoslovakian Republic – France. First, Czechoslovakia could be an important element of the «sanitary cordon» directed against Germany and the Soviets; second, she could perform the function of a potential bridge in the case of Franco-Soviet normalisation. Such roles of Czechoslovakia were not antagonistic, and Paris tried to combine them in the French foreign policy and strategy. The variety of international, regional and interior circumstances defined what role was emphasised by the leadership of the Third Republic. In 1919–1921, 1923, when the Soviet-French contradictions were sharp and Paris underlined the «Soviet menace», the right governments of France tended to think about Czechoslovakia more as an important element of the «sanitary cordon», though understanding that the latter wasn’t really solid. On the contrary, in 1922 and from end of 1923, while the interest of France in normalising the relations with the Soviets grew stronger, the role of Czechoslovakia as a potential bridge to USSR attracted more attention of the Paris (these aspirations remained unfulfilled). Though the French estimates were volatile and depended on person, the images of the russophilia of the Czechoslovakian society, and the thesis that antagonism Czechoslovakia and USSR couldn’t escalated to war, persisted.