“Institutions v. rules”: common financial politics implementation mechanism in the European Union

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Abstract

The organisational mechanism “institutions v. rules” is considered in the article as an alternative for supranational rules and international treaties within the international unions and integrational entities. On the certain stage of the international regional integration there is a need for common financial policy implemented by the member-states. However, public finance is a sensitive and complicated field for supranational regulation and international treaties. The technology “institutions v. rules” which implies creation of independent financial institutions monitoring and advising on the state’s financial policy can be an alternative for legal norms. The technology “institutions v. rules” is applied in the European Union but still underestimated in the EAEU.

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About the authors

Sergey O. Shokhin

Moscow state Institute (University) of International Relations of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation

Email: doctorsos07@rambler.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-2777-3615
ResearcherId: C-5244-2018
Russian Federation, Moscow

Ekaterina V. Kudryashova

Siberian University of Consumer Cooperation (SibUCC)

Author for correspondence.
Email: ev_kudryashova@inbox.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-7029-5794
SPIN-code: 7017-2770
ResearcherId: D-2011-2009
Russian Federation, Novosibirsk

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